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PAlAZZOLO ON REMAND: THERE WAS NO 
TAKING UNDER PENN CENTRAL 
EDWARD G. BOHLEN* 
On June 28, 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Anthony 
Palazzolo's claim that a Rhode Island regulation had effected a total 
taking of his property.! The Court remanded the case for examination 
of Palazzolo's takings claim under the analysis set forth in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New Ym*.2 This Article concludes that Mr. 
Palazzolo did not suffer a taking under Penn Central. 
Chief Justice Holmes enunciated the regulatory takings doctrine 
eighty years ago: "[WJhile property may be regulated to a certain ex-
tent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."3 The 
Court has been unable to develop any set formula for determining 
when justice and fairness require compensation for a taking, and has 
instead relied on "ad hoc, factual inquires."4 Since 1978, when the 
Court decided Penn Central, courts have decided whether the gov-
ernment went "too far" in a particular case by applying a balancing 
test in which three factors have particular significance.5 Those three 
factors are: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character of the gov-
ernment action.6 As explained below, Palazzolo has not suffered a tak-
ing under these three factors. 
* Assistant Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Massachusetts was 
amicus curiae to Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in the United States Supreme Court. This Article 
represents the opinions and legal conclusions of its author and not necessarily those of the 
Office of the Attorney General. Opinions of the Attorney General are formal documents 
rendered pursuant to specific statutory authority. 
1 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631-32 (2001). 
2438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
3 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
4 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
5 There is an exception to the three-factor test: if regulation strips aU economically 
beneficial use from the property, the court may find a "categorical taking" without apply-
ing the other two factors in Penn Centrals three-factor balancing test. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). The Court rejected this type of categorical takings 
claim by Palazzolo, and so the Lucas approach does not apply here. 
6 Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124. 
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I. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE REGULATION 
Palazzolo's property consists primarily of salt marsh wetland sub-
ject to tidal flooding, with at least one developable upland section.7 
Palazzolo argued to the U.S. Supreme Court that the upland portions 
of his property should be excluded from the takings analysis and his 
case should be viewed as a total regulatory taking of the wetlands por-
tion.s However, such a "partial taking" approach is contrary to Penn 
Central, where the Court stated that ". [t] aking' jurisprudence does 
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to de-
termine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely ab-
rogated. ''9 The court instead looks to the economic impact on the 
"parcel as a whole."lO The majority in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island noted in 
dicta that the Court had "at times expressed discomfort with the logic 
of this rule," citing dicta from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. ll 
However, the Court has not overruled, and in fact has repeatedly 
reaffirmed, Penn Centrals "parcel as a whole" approach.l2 
The Court has also held repeatedly that mere diminution in the 
value of property alone is insufficient to establish a regulatory tak-
ing.l3 However, the Court stated in Palazzolo that compensation may 
be required under Penn Central where regulation does not completely 
eliminate the value and use of the parcel as a whole, but diminishes 
them so much that only a "token interest" remains.14 
The Rhode Island Coastal Resource Management Council indi-
cated that it would have allowed Palazzolo to build one house on an 
7 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613, 621-23 (2001). 
8Id. at 631. 
9438 U.S. at 130. 
10Id. at 130-31. The "partial taking" approach has been adopted in a small number of 
federal cases. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1380-81 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), aff'd on reh g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), reh g en banc denied, 231 F.3d 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1568-70 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). However, under Penn Central, it generally is not a taking where regulation strips 
economic use, in whole or in part, from just one segment of an owner's property. Refer-
ring to takings under Lucas as "total" and takings under the Penn Central analysis as "par-
tial" takings add confusion to the terminology and ignore Penn Centrafs emphasis on ana-
lyzing the parcel as a whole. 
11 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631; if. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 
n.7 (1992). 
12 For example, see Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n u DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 496-97 
(1987), and, after the Lucas decision, Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. u Construc-
tion Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993), and, most recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Pres-
ervation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1481 (2002). 
IS Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645; Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131. 
14 Palaz.z.olo, 533 U.S. at 617,631. 
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upland portion; the trial court found that there was such a develop-
able lot, and that it would be worth about $200,000 (in 1986 dol-
lars).15 The U.S. Supreme Court described such upland value as "sub-
stantial" in rejecting Palazzolo's total takings claim.16 A house lot with 
that value, while less valuable than the subdivision or recreational 
beach club sought by Palazzolo, is an economically beneficial use, not 
a mere token. Given that the Rhode Island court on remand is bound 
by the "law of the case" to find that an upland piece can be developed 
and has value of about $200,000, the court will have to conclude that 
Palazzolo did not suffer a taking. 
In assessing the fairness to property owners of Rhode Island's 
regulations, the Rhode Island court should consider the "average 
reciprocity of advantage."17 ''While each of us is burdened somewhat 
by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions 
that are placed on others. "18 Tideland and sewage disposal regulations 
on the Rhode Island coast have burdened owners of coastal wetlands 
somewhat, but such regulations also have increased the value of de-
velopable upland parcels. 
II. THE EXTENT OF REGULATORY INTERFERENCE WITH DISTINCT 
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS 
Under this second Penn Centralfactor, a landowner's expectations 
must be "reasonable" in order to support a taking.19 Was it reasonable 
for Palazzolo to expect, when he acquired title to the property, that 
the government would permit him to fill a salt marsh tideland? 
The U.S. Supreme Court's majority was clear in Palazzolo in re-
jecting the so<alled "notice" rule; it stated that an owner's pre-
acquisition notice of regulations on property does not automatically 
bar a takings claim.20 However, Justice O'Connor represented a criti-
cal swing vote.21 She voted with the five:Justice majority to reject the 
notice rule, but was also part of a majority, with the four dissenters, 
indicating that the existence of prior regulations may affect the rea-
15 [d. at 621-22. 
16 [d. at 616. 
17 SeePa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 u.s. 393, 415 (1922). 
18 Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1922). 
19 E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 500 (1998); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164,175 (1979). 
20 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630. 
21 See id. at 633 (O'Connor,]. concurring). 
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sonableness of expectations.22 She stated that a prior regulatory re-
gime "helps to shape the reasonableness of those expectations," and 
that "[c]ourts properly consider the effect of existing regulations un-
der the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining 
whether a compensable taking has occurred. "23 Therefore, whether 
Palazzolo's expectations were reasonable may depend in part on 
whether, when he became the owner of the property, Rhode Island 
law regulated the filling of salt marsh tidelands. In other words, 
should Palazzolo be compensated for the loss of development value of 
his land if, when he became the owner, existing Rhode Island law 
prohibited development without permits? The U.S. Supreme Court 
did not rule on this point. 
As the state attorney general pointed out on brief to the Court, 
Rhode Island has protected public rights to tidelands long before 
Palazzolo owned the property.24 At common law, the state owned in 
fee the soil in tidewaters below the high-water mark.25 In 1876, Rhode 
Island enacted a law to control and manage "the public tide-waters. "26 
The principle of public rights in tidelands and the requirement of 
permits for encroachments or filling were reaffirmed by subsequent 
statutes and case law.27 In 1965, Rhode Island enacted a comprehen-
sive regulatory program, derived from these long-standing protections 
of public rights, imposing permitting requirements and restricting 
22 See id.; id. at 643 n.6, 644-45 (Stevens,j., concurring in part, dissenting in part); id. 
654 n.3 (Ginsburg, Souter & Breyer,jJ., dissenting); id. at 654-55 (Breyer,j., dissenting). 
2' Id. at 633,635 (O'Connor,j., concurring). 
24 Brief for Respondents, 2002 WL 22908, at *7, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 
606 (2001) (No. 99-2047) [hereinafter Brieffor Respondents]. 
25 Bailey v. Burges, 11 RI. 330, 331 (1876); accord, e.g., Town of Warren v. Thornton-
Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1259 (RI. 1999) ("the state holds title to all land below the 
high water mark in a proprietary capacity for the benefit of the public"). This state owner-
ship of soil under tidewater continues until a private owner actually fills under some form 
of state "license" to do so. Gerhard v. Seekonk River Bridge Comm'rs, 5 A. 199,200 (RI. 
1886). 
26 1876 RI. Acts & Resolves ch. 556, §§ 3-4, 7. 
27 See, e.g., RI. GEN. LAws §§ 3-5, 10-12, 14 (1896) (current version at RI. GEN. LAws 
§§ 46-1-2,46-6-1 to -6-6) (R.I. GEN. LAws § 46-6-5 repealed 2002); 1918 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 
1669, §§ 2,10 (current version at RI. GEN. LAws §§ 46-1-1,46-1-2); Dawson v. Broome, 53 
A. 151, 152 (RI. 1902). 
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uses to those that would not be detrimental to the salt marshes.28 
Rhode Island has also regulated sewage disposal for decades.29 
Given Rhode Island's long history of regulating the filling of tide-
lands and sewage disposal, Palazzolo could not have reasonably ex-
pected that he would be permitted either to fill the tideland or to 
build the proposed seventy-four-unit subdivision upon which he based 
his takings claim of $3.15 million. 
On remand, there may be an argument regarding when Palaz-
zolo became the owner of the property. This may help determine 
whether his investment-backed expectations were reasonable. The 
facts regarding the timing of ownership are complicated. It appears 
that while Palazzolo had involvement with the property beginning in 
1959 through the corporation that owned the property, Shore Gar-
dens, Inc. (SGI), he did not become the owner of the property until 
1978, and then only by Rhode Island's revocation of SGI's corporate 
charter.3o Whether Palazzolo acquired title to the property in 1959 or 
1978 apparently makes no difference. Given that Rhode Island law 
required a permit for any filling of tidelands well before 1959, Palaz-
zolo had constructive knowledge of Rhode Island's restrictions when 
he became the owner of the property, whether that occurred in 1959 
or 1978.31 
The court on remand may consider a related issue that the 
United States Supreme Court did not decide: whether Rhode Island's 
public trust doctrine and its laws requiring permits for filling tide-
lands are part of "background principles of the State's law of property 
28 RI. GEN. LAws §§ 2-1-13,2-1-14. In 1971, Rhode Island enacted a law creating the 
Coastal Resources Management Council and transferring the authority to regulate coastal 
wetlands to that agency from the Division of Harbors and Rivers. See R.I. GEN. LAws 
§§ 46-23-1 to -12 (1971). 
29 The Rhode Island Attorney General indicated on brief to the Court that such laws 
date back to 1920. Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at *7-9; if. R.I. GEN. LAws 
§ 46-12-2 & compiler's note (1956); 1963 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 89, § 2; 1935 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 
2250, §§ 110, 115; 1921 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 2090; 1920 RI. Pub. Laws ch. 1914, § 2 (creating 
the Board of Purification of Waters); Bd. of Purification of Waters v. City of East Provi-
dence, 133 A. 812, 814 (RI.1926). 
so Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 614 (2001). 
~l If 1978 is the proper date for Palazzolo's ownership and expectations rather than 
1959, the trend toward tighter wetlands restrictions could be an additional reason that 
Palazzolo's expectations were unreasonable. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that a developer lacked reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions when he purchased land that would require regulatory approval before development 
was allowed). The Good court stated that "rising environmental awareness translated into 
ever-tightening land use regulations. Surely Appellant was not oblivious to this trend.» [d. 
168 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 30: 163 
and nuisance"32 or are reasonably derived from such background 
principles.33 The Palazzolo Court described background principles as 
"those common, shared understandings of permissible limitations de-
rived from a State's legal tradition."34 Given Rhode Island's long legal 
traditions explained above, the public trust doctrine and Rhode Is-
land laws regulating the filling of tidelands and sewage disposal are 
either part of background principles of state law or at least reasonably 
derived from such background principles. 
The court on remand may also consider whether the filling of 
Palazzolo's wetland would be a nuisance.35 Again, as the Rhode Island 
Attorney General pointed out on brief to the United States Supreme 
Court, nuisance doctrine has for many years limited what could be 
done in developing property in the State of Rhode Island.36 The trial 
court found that filling Palazzolo's eighteen-acre salt marsh would be 
a public nuisance.37 Unless the Rhode Island Supreme Court reverses 
the trial court's nuisance finding on remand, there would be no tak-
ing based on reasonable investment-backed expectations even if the 
regulations are not derived from other background principles of 
Rhode Island law. 38 
III. THE CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENT ACTION 
The Court said in Penn Central that "a use restriction on real 
property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the 
effectuation of a substantial public purpose, ... or perhaps if it has an 
unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property. "39 In re-
!2 The Court discussed "background principles" in Lucas u South Carolina Coastal Coun-
cilin the context oftotal takings. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). Justice Kennedy, who deliv-
ered the Court's opinion in Palazzolo, stated in his Lucas concurrence that "[c]oastal prop-
erty may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go 
further in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might 
otherwise permit." Id. at 1035 (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
!! Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30. 
MId. 
115 See id. at 630; Palazzolo v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, C.A. No. 88-0297, 1997 WL 
1526546, at *5 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1997), a/I'd on other grounds sub nom. Palazzolo v. 
State ex reL Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 709 (R.I. 2000), a//'d in part, rev'd in part, remanded sub 
nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
!16 Brief for Respondents, supra note 24, at *42-43; see, e.g., Payne & Butler v. Provi-
dence Gas Co., 77 A. 145, 151 (R.I. 1910). 
!7 Coastal Res. Mgmt. Counci~ 1997 WL 1526546, at *5. 
!8 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
!9 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citations omitted). The alleged interference with property 
here is not a physical invasion by the government, where a taking could more readily be 
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jecting the notice rule, the Court in Palazzolo distinguished between 
reasonable and unreasonable prospective enactments regarding tak-
ings.40 
There should be no question that Rhode Island has a substantial 
state interest in protecting environmentally sensitive salt marsh tide-
lands, and that the permitting requirements regulating filling are rea-
sonably necessary to effectuate that purpose. The character of the 
government action therefore does not support Palazzolo's takings 
claim. 
In conclusion, Rhode Island's land regulations clearly did not "go 
too far. "41 The court should find on remand that Palazzolo did not 
suffe~ a taking. 
found. ld. at 124. See generaUy Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA1V Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982). 
40 Palaz.z.ow, 533 U.S. at 627. 
41 SeePa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 

